In 2001, the Sustainable Development Strategy was formulated by the European Union and, for the first time, a framework aimed at incorporating methods of sustainable development into European policymaking was adopted. In 4 mate change mitigation policy, energy efficiency in transport is improved significantly. However, we also find that the presence of an overarching climate change objective is not enough to guarantee meeting a number of interim transportation sub-targets.
The impacts of long term CO2 objectives on short term transportation trends in the European Union Paper on Transport has received considerable attention from policy-makers and researchers, relatively little academic focus has centred on the impact of the SDS on transportation trends in the European Union This is particularly interesting given that the overriding environmental objective outlined in the SDS is to cap the increase in global temperature rise to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of this century. In order to achieve this goal, the European Union has committed itself to a stringent interim target of reduction in carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions by 2050. This objective aims to reduce emissions from the EU by between 60% and 80% compared to 1990 levels (CEU, 2007) . It is clear that the pursuit and achievement of such a target will impact on future trends in European transportation.
Accordingly, in this paper, we investigate the impact of the overall objective of reducing CO 2 emissions by between 60 and 80% by 2050 on the more focused transportation objectives outlined in the SDS. To do this, we compare the state and trends of European transportation up to 2050 in a business-asusual or reference scenario, and in an ambitious carbon pricing scenario compatible with the proposed 2ºC cap on temperature increase. Both scenarios are harmonised projections of the global dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R, and of the POLES model of global energy markets, thereby guaranteeing full consistency between the macroeconomic and energy balances. We explore whether reaching the ambitious target of a 60% to 80% reduction in CO 2 by 2050 "dominates" other targets specifically related to the transport sphere. In other words, we assess if by achieving this ambitious CO 2 reduction target by mid century, sub-targets related to transport outlined in the SDS will be, almost by definition, achieved or even overshot.
The outline of the paper is as follows: section 1 presents some key transportation trends in the European Union as it stands, outlines some of the problems associated with transport, and investigates some of the policy responses pursued by European policy-makers. Section 2 briefly reviews the SDS, paying particular attention to its role in relation to transport. Section 3 presents an overview of the IMACLIM-R and POLES models and reports key assumptions and general results of the baseline and policy projections. Section 4 tests the hypothesis outlined above. Finally, section 6 concludes with some policy observations.
I. Transportation trends in the European Union
The demand for transportation in Europe has been growing rapidly in recent decades and that trend largely continues today. This has had a significant impact on Europe's consumption of oil and the resulting emissions of greenhouse gases and specifically CO 2 . Personal mobility on the continent now averages 35 km a day-doubling since 1970 (CEC, 2006) . Meanwhile, the number of cars in the EU has tripled and we are witnessing a growth rate in the region of 3 million cars a year (CEC, 2001a) . These trends have manifested themselves in significant growth in road transportation demand-between 1995 and 2004 road transportation grew by 19% for passenger cars and by 35% for freight movements (measured by passenger-kilometres and tonne kilometres respectively). The road transportation sector now accounts for 44% of total freight transport and almost 85% of total passenger transport. With regard to the latter area, the private car accounts for three-quarters of passenger transport while transport by bus and coach (long-distance bus) combined accounts for less than 10% (these latter modes have grown by a modest 5% over the last decade). Rail transport has continued to decline in importance and now only accounts for 10% of freight transport and 7% of total passenger transport. As a result of such trends, private cars account for more than half of all oil con-sumed by transport. Emissions from transport contributed 28% of all CO 2 emissions in Europe-one of the fastest-growing sectors. With road transportation heavily dependent on oil (it accounts for 67% of final European demand for oil), it alone accounts for almost 85% of CO 2 emissions from transport (CEC, 2006) . In tandem with environmental concerns, security of supply issues and institutional changes within the EU, transportation has moved onto the European policy agenda over the last two decades. The European Commission (EC)'s first White Paper on Transport (CEC, 1992) focused on the achievement of a single market in transport rather than on sustainability issues. However, it did characterise the problems arising from excessive growth in road transport demand, through linking unequal modal share development to increased congestion and harmful environmental effects. The related White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (CEC, 1993) warned about the dangers of congestion impacting negatively on productivity. Such negative impacts can occur because of the nature of congestion. It can be defined in some respects as excessive demand and can occur because once road tax is paid, every user has access to the road network at all times (with the exception of tolled roads). As usage of the road network increases, so typically do marginal costs associated with road transportation. The costs of transport are not restricted to users of the infrastructure. Indeed, the external costs of road traffic congestion 2 alone can amount to 0.5% of EU gross domestic product (GDP) and traffic forecasts for the next decade indicate that in the absence of policy interventions, road congestion will increase significantly by 2010. These congestion costs will also increase by 142% to reach 80 billion euros a year, which is approximately 1% of the EU's GDP (CEC, 2001a) . In addition to traffic congestion, the external costs of transport include accidents, road damage externalities and environmental costs. The latter costs consist of regional environmental effects (including barrier effects, 3 acidification and noise; for more see Sterner, 2003) and air pollution (with both local and global impacts).
1 Cf. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/4_5_1_en.htm (accessed 1 July 2007).
2 Congestion occurs because the motorist's private marginal costs diverge from the cost he/she imposes on society. The externalities can manifest themselves as delays in business transactions, excess business and private time lost to congestion, etc. 3 For instance: severance impacts on ecosystems or communities arising from the construction of a motorway.
The economic problem of traffic congestion is related to the 'public good' nature of road space (i.e., restricting access to it is difficult). However, road space is in reality rarely a 'pure' public good-beyond a certain point of demand, congestion and rivalry exist. As road usage levels increase, the non- Consequently, the focus of European policy-makers in the area of transportation has widened from a primarily economic analysis (as per the White Paper of 1992) to encompass the other main spheres of sustainability, namely the environmental and social areas. This has been mirrored in the development of the White Papers. This recognition that transportation impacts on areas beyond the movement of people and goods (because of the aforementioned externalities), has allowed for the development of policy objectives aimed at addressing the aforementioned sustainability questions.
As noted, the first comprehensive policy intervention in transportation by the EC focused primarily on economic issues related to the movement of goods and people (CEC, 1992) . The follow-up policy document in 2001 outlined a number of key objectives for transportation in Europe:
• To offer a high level of mobility to people and businesses throughout the EU;
• To protect the environment, ensure energy security, promote minimum labour standards for the sector and protect the passenger and the citizen;
• To allow for innovation in support of the first two aims by increasing the efficiency and sustainability of the transport sector;
• To connect internationally by projecting the EU's policies to reinforce sustainable mobility, protection and innovation (CEC, 2006) . • Decoupling economic growth and the demand for transport with the aim of reducing environmental impact;
• Achieving sustainable levels of transport energy use and reducing transport GHG emissions;
• Reducing pollutant emissions from transport and their impact on human health;
• Achieving a balanced shift towards environmentally friendly transport modes (this has already been formulated as a return to 1998 modal shares by 2010);
• Reducing CO 2 emission from light duty vehicle to 120g/km by 2012.
Given the short time horizon between the original SDS and the renewed strategy, it is interesting to note the flexibility in target formulation and development. In the intervening period, a number of these targets were altered, revealing flexibility in the policy process. However despite this, neither the strategy nor the related transport white papers explore how the achievement of the long-term climate change goal will impact on these shorter-term transportation targets. While some targets have broad interpretations so as to be able to incorporate the impacts of the long-term targets, others are more specific. This juxtaposition between the short-term sub-targets in EU policy-making related to transportation and the long-term climate change objectives develops into an interesting story for researchers. We investigate this relationship by developing a number of policy scenarios aimed at exploring the impact of achieving the ultimate climate change aim of a 60-80% reduction in CO 2 emissions by 2050 on transport sub-targets.
III. Scenario Development
The baseline and the policy scenario that allow us to test our research hypothesis are based on harmonised projections of the IMACLIM-R and POLES models. These are outlined below.
III.1. IMACLIM-R Model

IMACLIM-R (IMpact Assessment of CLIMate policies-Recursive version) is a dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model specifically built to
interface with bottom-up expertise on energy systems (Crassous et al., 2006) .
The version that produced the scenarios commented upon in this paper projects the world economy every year up to 2050. It details 12 world regions, including Europe, 8 and 12 economic sectors, among which air, sea, and land transportation activities are defined as three distinct sectors. In IMACLIM-R, economic growth mainly results from exogenous assumptions about population and labour productivity dynamics. However, international trade, particularly that of energy commodities, and imperfect markets for both labour (wage curve) and capital (constrained capital flows, varying utilisation rates), significantly impact on the equilibrium growth resulting from these assumption. In this general framework, transportation demands result from the following.
• Intermediate consumption of transport by all sectors: the three transportation activities are inputs into the 12 sectors detailed. They consecutively grow as the sectors expand, in a proportion depending on priceinduced variations in each sector's transportation intensity. For the scenarios reported here these variations were calibrated on POLES results.
• Household demand: This has an elaborate specification. Mobility, defined as an aggregate of four imperfectly substitutable travelling modes 8 40-plus countries of geographical Europe, not the EU strictly speaking.
(air travel, public terrestrial modes, personal cars and non motorised modes), is one of the elements of the utility function of the representative household of each region. In addition, on top of their budget constraint, households are subject to a travelling-time constraint. 9 Last but not least, the 'travelling time efficiency' (average distance covered in an hour of time) of each mode is described as an increasing function of public investment in the infrastructure dedicated to this mode.
III.2. POLES Model
The and limits to the penetration rates. As regards freight, the tonne-kilometre 9 Following 'Zahavi's law', establishing that the daily time spent in transportation is quite stable across time and regions of the world, regardless of the transportation mode-and hence of the distance covered. 10 Fossil fuel production is simulated by a detailed discovery-process model for the main producing countries and a more compact model for the minor ones. Production is maximum for all regions ('fatal' producers) except major producers (e.g., the OPEC for oil), which adjust their own production to cover excess demand. The reserves to production ratio of major producers drives the international prices.
(tkm) demand of road freight transport is projected following an econometric specification with total GDP and short-and long-term fuel price elasticities as arguments.
III.3. Modelling Carbon Policies
In the aggregate economic framework of both IMACLIM-R and POLES, the complex mix of policy tools aiming at curving carbon emissions (ranging from market instruments to command and control measures, on varying geographical scales) is usually symbolised by a region-specific uniform carbon pricing.
This pricing is introduced in the form of an excise tax, with the carbon content of each specific energy consumption as a basis; in both the harmonised runs developed for this research, the revenue raised is 'lump-sum recycled', i.e.
directly transferred to households-aggregated to their labour and capital revenues to define their budget constraint.
Although both models can be used to assess more subtle policy and revenue recycling options, this fairly standard policy perspective, summed up by its carbon pricing, allows for a ready comparison with other modelling exercises (see e.g. Weyant and Hill, 1999, or IPCC, 2001 , for frequently-quoted surveys of modelling results expressed in such terms).
III.4. Scenario Development
Harmonised runs of the two models were developed through a 'soft-linking' approach, that is an iterative running with back-and-forth exchanges of modelling outputs-the only assumption common to both models, total population, having been identically matched to the 2004 median projection of the UN. In a nutshell, the successive IMACLIM-R runs were made to exploit POLES' expertise on energy matters (e.g. fundamental trends on primary energy markets, energy intensities and mixes for the different sectors and households, etc.).
The successive POLES runs themselves resorted to the updated GDP and sectoral outputs (the latter being used as activity indicators) computed by IMACLIM-R. The complementary nature of the two models allowed for reaching a satisfactory degree of convergence quite rapidly.
The harmonised baseline or 'reference' (REF) scenario projects our businessas-usual assumptions in which (cf. Table 1 ):
• Europe and the other industrialised countries limit the impact of increasingly low demographics by maintaining a steady growth in labour productivity;
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• China and India see their currently high growth rates slow down, as (i) their labour productivity increases to a peak, (ii) their demography stabilises, and (iii) rapidly increasing energy prices hamper their relatively energy-intensive economic activity;
• Fossil fuels exporters, despite stabilising demographics, greatly benefit from the rents they extract from increasingly tense energy markets;
• In the rest of the world, increases in labour productivity slowly take over the sheer impact of demographics as the latter effect slows down. 11 Note that, for comparison purposes, the growth of European labour productivity was specifically adjusted to allow the computed GDP growth to reach the same level as envisaged in the ASSESS assessment of the first White Paper (CEC, 2001a). The value typically used in IMACLIM-R scenarios (based on Maddison, 2001 ) is annually ca. 0.6 percentage points lower, leading to a significantly lower GDP growth. Table 2 .
Average annual growth of CO2 emissions, REF scenario
Comparing Table 1 and 2 reveals some decoupling of growth and emissions (i.e., we see CO 2 emissions growing at a slower rate than GDP). This is mainly due (in the absence of a proactive emission reduction policy) to a dematerialisation of growth. Such a relationship typically exists when economies move from a base that is more dependent on (energy-intensive) heavy industry to one in which services dominate. The dematerialisation feature is true for the industrialised world, to a lesser extent for China and India, and also in a subtly different way for fossil fuels exporters (in their case, the increasing rents they draw from energy markets are a major source of dematerialisation). However, it is much less true for the rest of the world. This is because of the 'mimetic 17 On the basis of these prerequisites, the trajectory developed for our F4 scenario is indeed similar to the WRE450 trajectory (Wigley et al., 1996) • The rapid diffusion of very-low-emission equipment in the building, transportation, and industrial sectors;
• The increased development and diffusion of low-or no-carbon energy technologies, such as renewables, third generation nuclear power, and carbon capture and storage;
• The development and diffusion of industrial production techniques of radically innovative materials.
Still, the scenario as it stands is somewhat conservative as it does not hypothesise induced changes in lifestyles, location and urbanisation choices. It would be reasonable to assume that such behavioural changes would allow for even more radical changes.
Integrating this extended POLES expertise, IMACLIM-R computes macroeconomic conditions up to 2050. We find that the general macroeconomic conse- scenario. After 2030, the average growth rates converge. What might be of concern to policy-makers and researchers alike is that the likely reduction in annual growth rates is front-loaded, with the benefits being felt further in the future. The impact on the other industrialised countries, on India and China and on the rest of the world is smaller (annual growth is reduced by an average of 0.1% and 0.2% respectively for the first two regions while the rest of the world sees no negative aggregate impact over the period). However, fossil fuels exporters see annual growth fall from 3.1% to 2.6% per annum up to 2050. This is related to the fact that (i) their export volumes are greatly reduced, and
(ii) the consequently much lower tensions on the oil and gas markets allow for much lower rents. Table 3 . Average annual growth of real GDP, F4 scenario
IV. European road transportation: from current trends to an F4 European Union
With a convergence process close to but not 100%, the following detailed road transportation results are systematically derived from applying POLES technological detail (technology mixes, relative fuel efficiencies and carbon intensities) and regional breakdown 18 to the aggregate IMACLIM-R figures of transportation activities and energy consumptions. This confirms the oft-reported finding (see e.g. Espey, 1998 , or Goodwin et al., 2004 , for a survey), somewhat disturbing for policy-makers, that carbon pricing (even at significant levels) has only a marginal impact on mobility and the modal shares. That overall vkm are so inelastic to even large price changes has important implications for policy in this arena. What we present in the F4 scenario is a situation in which stringent restrictions are placed on emissions of CO 2 . Yet, despite this, the mobility trends (i.e., vkm) are largely unaffected. However, the stronger shift towards the cleaner technologies occurs in the F4 scenarios due to the massive carbon pricing (whereas the increases in oil prices are much more moderate due to much lower tensions on oil markets). 
V. Conclusions
This paper has set out to investigate the impact of stringent long-term climate change mitigation targets on the shorter-run trends in the transportation arena.
To do this, we have investigated the impact of the overall objective of reducing emissions of CO 2 by between 60 and 80% by 2050 on some transport objectives outlined in the SDS. We have employed a scenario-based approach over the time horizon of 2001 to 2050 and explored a business-as-usual reference scenario and a scenario with an ambitious carbon pricing assumption.
Both scenarios are harmonised projections of the global dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R, and of the POLES model of global energy markets, thereby guaranteeing full consistency between the macroeconomic and energy balances. At the outset, we hypothesise that reaching the ambitious target of a 60% to 80% reduction in CO 2 by 2050 will "dominate" other targets specifically related to the transport sphere. To do this, we introduce a number of targets outlined in the SDS. In fact, we find
that the hypothesis that we tested can be rejected. We see that under both the REF scenario and the scenario in which strong carbon price signals are given, the interim transport policy targets are not met. This is a stark finding and one that should be of concern to policy-makers. It indicates that the presence of a long-term target for climate change mitigation (even one that is acted upon)
does not guarantee that short-run transportation sub-targets will be met. We conclude that the structure of the market forbids immediate reactions to price signals (even very significant ones).
In addition to the above, we have seen that the imposition of the carbon price signal does have some impact on economic growth. This is especially the case for Europe. We find that projected economic growth is reduced by the introduction of a pricing signal for carbon; however, the impact reduces over time.
Worryingly for policy-makers, this implies that while the benefits are spread over the whole period, the negative impacts are focused within a shorter time horizon. This again reflects the inertia existing in the vehicle fleet market and the resultant lag in response to policy initiatives. Despite this, we do see that the impact of the carbon pricing strategy is significant. We find that in our In China, India and the Rest of the World, we see the price signal per tonne of CO 2 climb to a more modest but still substantial $228. The scenario as it stands is somewhat conservative as it does not hypothesise induced changes in lifestyles, location and urbanisation choices. It would be reasonable to assume that such behavioural changes would allow for even more radical changes.
When estimating the impact of our policy agenda on transport mobility (expressed as vehicle-kilometres), we found-in common with other studies-that light-duty vehicle mobility is inelastic to even large price signals for carbon.
We do, however, see a significant impact on the composition of the fleet (in the medium to long run). In the F4 scenario high carbon prices act as a signal and the market shares of less emitting technologies are boosted. This seems to imply that while mobility is not affected by the carbon pricing strategy, the composition of the fleet undergoes some significant changes.
A similar trend is seen in the area of energy consumption. Energy consumption The second biggest CO 2 contributor, trucks, also sees a decline in its emissions (albeit more modest).
As we have seen in the previous sections, the impact of the stringent policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions only begin to take effect in the medium to long term. We propose that the key explanation for the lack of divergence between the two scenarios in the short term is the structure of the vehicle fleet market. The inherent inertia in fleet turnover and substitution hinders short-term responses to policy actions; yet by 2050, we see a significant divergence in the transportation trends (with the exception of overall mobility) under the two scenarios. Emissions from transport now contribute over a quarter of all CO 2 emissions in Europe. Despite this short-term inertia, we find that in the presence of significant pricing signals, the transportation trends do begin to diverge (due primarily to the penetration of cleaner technologies in the medium to long run). This is an important finding for policy-makers.
Given that transportation is amongst the most rigid of all sectors in relation to emissions of CO 2 , the long-term findings are encouraging. Despite finding that the presence of a long-term overarching climate change mitigation objective does not guarantee the achievement of interim related goals, the sector does react to the pricing signals in the longer term. The evident short-term inertia should not hinder policymakers who wish to initiate policies aimed at reducing emissions from this sector.
